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This survey obviously does not include all the cases reported and all
the laws passed during the period of review.' Material was included if,
in the opinion of the writer, it was related to a significant change or need
thereof, a point of first impression, a clarification or complication of
ambiguity or controversy, a possible trend, an amplification of all important
area, or matters of potential social significance.
SENTENCE
I. Deferment of sentence by trial judge.
By statutory modification and clear judicial interpretation the power
of judges to defer sentencing has been limited. In one instance the trial
judge deferred passing sentence and released the convicted defendant on
his recognizance. More than two years later the defendant was sentenced
to a term of two years in the State Penitentiary. On appeal, the District
Court2 considered that older cases wherein such deferments were approved
are not controlling because they were not decided in the light of the Florida
Constitution as affected by the present par'ole and probation law,3 which
provided for suspension and probation only if the defendant were placed
in the custody of the Parole Commission. 4 The court ordered that the
defendant be discharged because the trial judge's procedure, which was
tantamount to placing the defendant on unsupervised probation, went beyond
the court's jurisdiction and was a denial of due process. The District
Court adopted this view in subsequent cases.5
II. Reduction of sentence by appellate judge.
In Stanford v. State," the Supreme Court held that it would not reduce
or modify a sentence which is less than the maximum fixed by law. The
majority reasoned that since the constitutional issue of cruel and inhuman
punishment relates to the statute, the statute, not the sentence, should be
attacked. Further, the court noted that if the sentence be harsh or unjust,
relief is available from the parole authorities. The dissent stated that
*Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Miami.
1. 'I'he survey includes cases reported in 96 So.2d through 113 So.2d 224, and laws
enacted by the Florida Legislature Special Session 1957 and the 1959 General Session,
2. Blatch v. State, 101. So.2d 869, 876 (Fla. App. 1958).
3. FLA. STAT. § 948.01 (1957),
4. FLA. S'rAT. § 949.03 (1957).
5. Cameron v. State, 112 So.2d 864 (Fla. App. 1959); DeLoach v. State, IIl
So.2d 458 (Fla. App. 1958); Williams v. State, 101 So.2d 877 (Fa. App. 1958).
6. 110 So.2d I (Fla. 1959).
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the sentence was in issue because an appellate court has the general power
to correct an abuse of discretion, and the particular statute involved specifi-
cally provided for "any lesser term of years at the discretion of the court."
Several out-of-state cases approving the reduction of sentence on the basis
of abuse of discretion were cited. Contra Florida cases were distinguished
by showing that they were decided on the issue of cruel and inhuman
treatment rather than on abuse of discretion.8 In the particular instance,
the defendants were teenagers; they did not deliberately plan the robbery
($5.00), and none of them had a criminal record. The scntences were from
six to ten years. The dissenting judges noted that long sentences, in some
instances, may be more likely to produce hardened crimlinals than rchabili-
tated citizens. It is implicit in their position that although the parole and
pardon authorities may consider this problem, appellate judges also have
responsibility in the matter. The writer appreciates the position of the dis-
seating judges - that judges have responsibility for the results of their
decisions.
III. Modification of sentence by appellate judge.
The defendant was sentenced in the Criminal Court of Record to
90 days in the county jail. On appeal, the circuit judge changed the
sentence to a $100 fine. The District Court of Appeal" extended the
holding in Krauss v. Chillingworth,' 0 that a circuit judge may not modify
the sentence of the judge of the County Court, by including within its
scope the sentence of a judge of the Criminal Court of Record.
ACCUSEn AS A WITNESS
The statutory procedural rights of the defendant are protected care-
fully by the courts.' Most actions by the state which would jeopardize
these rights are prohibited. Most attempts by the state to force the
defendant to choose between two rights are defeated by giving the defendant
full benefit of both. The tendency seeis to be to expand these rights, and
7. State v. Jackson, 30 N.M. 309 223 Pac 49 (1924; State v. Ramirez, 34 Idaho
623, 203 Pac. 279 (1921); State v. 6 lander, 193 Iowa 1379, 186 NAV. 53 (1922);
Aabel v. State, 86 Neb. 711, 126 N.W. 316 (1910); State v. Ross. 55 Oe. '50, 10
Pac. 1022 (1910).
S. Hutlev v. State, 94 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1957); Emmett v. State, 89 So.2d 659
(FIa. 1956); La Barbera v. State, 63 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1953); W\talker v. State, 44 So.2d
814 (Fla. 1950).
9. State v. Atwell, 97 So.2d 125 (Fla. App. 1957).
10. 88 Fla. 468, 103 So. 120 (1924).
I1. FLA. STAT. § 918.09 (1957): "Accused may make himself a witness. - In all
criminal prosecutions the accused may at his option be sworn as a witness in his own
behalf, and shall in such case be subject to examination as other witnesses, but no
accused person shall be compelled to give testimony against himself, nor shall any
prosecuting attorney be permitted before the jury or court to comment on the failure
of the accused to testify in his own behalf, and a defendant offering no testimony in




ambiguities are usually construed in the defendant's favor. The tendency
reaches beyond the statute and affects the interprctation of rules in other
areas of law.
I. Closing arguments.
'If the defendant were charged with two separate homicides, he would
have the option of offering evidence other than his own in one charge and
preserving the closing argument in the other. In such a case the option
was preserved by prohibiting consolidation. 12 Consolidation however, was
allowed where the two causes arose from the same event so that the




Carter and Faulk were co-defendants represented by common counsel.
Carter called a witness whose testimony was beneficial to Faulk as well
as to himself. Faulk did not present evidence other than his own. The
District Court of Appeal held that Faulk had lost his right to the closing
argument.' Faulk brought the problem to the supreme court by writ of
certiorari.' The judges noted that the state exercised its option to consoli-
date for its own purposes, and this should not have the effect of jeopardizing
either the defendant's procedural right, or of limiting his choice of counsel.
To -protect the defendant in both matters, the state is made to assume
the risk that the evidence for one might be beneficial to the other.
Therefore, the court held that where two defendants are tried jointly and
are represented by the same counsel and one presents evidence other than
his own that is beneficial to his co-defendant, the co-defendant does not
thereby lose his closing argument. The court referred to Fuller v. State 7
wherein the two defendants were represented by the same counsel. There a
witness was placed on the stand "for the defense." After the testimony the
prosecution stated that it had no questions. Then, at this advanced stage
of the proceedings, the defense announced that the witness was called for
the benefit of only one defendant, and that the other was still entitled
to the closing argument. The announcement there was held to have come
too late. In the present case the witness was called specifically for only
one defendant.
12. Meade v. State, 85 So.2d 613 (Fla. 1956).
13. Blackwclder v. State. 100 So.2d 834 (Fla. App. 1958).
14. McClure v. State. 104 So.2d 601 (Fla. App. 1958).
15. Carter v. State, 101 So.2d 911 (Fla. App. 1958).
16. Faulk v. State, 104 So.2d 519 (Fla. 1958).
17. 159 Fla. 200, 31 So.2d 259 (1947).
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2. Different counsel.
An interesting variation of the problem arose where joint defendants
had different counsel.' Counsel for the defendant in question cross-
examined a witness placed on the stand by the co-defendant. The state
argued that the cross-cxamination had gone beyond material covered on
direct and, thus, the defendant had made the witness his own and thereby
had lost the closing argument. The court held that a defendant has the
right to cross-examine any witness whether offered by the state or co-
defendant without losing the closing argument, and further noted that
the state could have objected to any improper questions on cross-examination.
13. Meaning of "testimony except his own."
At one stage of the law's development, the defendant was entitled
to the closing only if the defense had not offered any testimony. The
rule was expanded to allow the defendant the closing if he did not offer
"testimony except his own." A further expansion has resulted by broaden-
ing the meaning of this concept. In a case of first impression the court
held that where the testimony of a character witness for the defendant
was restricted to the lattcr's reputation for truth, the defendant
did not lose the closing argument."' Such limited evidence was not consi-
dered to be "testimony other than his own." Previously the courts have
had occasion to determine whether objects such as maps,20 , photographs,21
and shirts,2 2 which were introduced in evidence deprived the defendant
of the closing argument. This case may open a new area for interpretation -
types of statements made by the witnesses for the defendant.
C. Effect on other areas of the law.
In an abortion case -'; the defendant wanted to impeach the prosecutrix
by showing that she had made statements at the trial which were incon-
sistent with her previous statcments. The state claimed that according to
the best cvidencc rule the defendant would be required to introduce the
previous statements into evidence. The court noted that such an application
of the rule would be unfair because it would force the defendant to lose
his closing argument in order to cross-examine adequately. The problem was
rcsolved by holding that the best evidence rule does not apply where the
purpose is impeachment rather than proof.
A defendant's option of introducing evidence, or of preserving the
closing implies that he has information upon which to make a choice. This
18. Beard v. State, 104 So.2d 680 (Fla. App. 1958).
19. Anderson v. State, 107 So.2d 785 .Fla. App. 1958).
20. Barkley v. State, 152 Fla. 147, 1D So.2d 922 (1943);.Iladdock v. State, 121
Via. 192, 163 So. 482 (1935).
21. Kennedy v. State, 83 So.2d 4 (Fa. 1955); Talley v. State, 36 So.2d 201
(ia. 1948).
22. Birge v. State, 92 So.2d 819 (Fla. 1957).
23 Urga v. State, 104 So.2d 43 (Fla. App. 1958).
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information includes knowledge of whether or not the state has sustained
the burden of presenting a prima facie case of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Therefore, the court in Adams v, State24 held that where the
defendant made a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the state's
evidence, it was error for the trial judge to hold his decision in abeyance.
II. Comment by Prosecution.
A literal interpretation of the statute would indicate that if the
defendant testified at all, the protection of the statute against comment
would be lost. In Odom v. State,25 the defendant testified to his name,
age and grade completed in school. The court found this testimony
sufficient to justify comment by the prosecution to the effect that the
defendant did not deny guilt.
-lowever, the fact that the defendant testified at the trial does not
necessarily preclude the protection of the statute. In Hathaway v. State,26
the court held that it was error for the prosecution to bring out on cross-
examination of the defendant that he did not testify during the preliminary
hearing. This case not only places the preliminary hearing within the
statute, but also incorporates cross-examination of the defendant within
the scope of "comment by the prosecution,"
An apparent conflict may occur between the statute and other rules.
The rule with respect to stolen goods is that the unexplained possession
of the goods by the defendant is a circumstance from which an inference
of guilt may be derived. Obviously, the state should have the right to refer
to this law, but at the same time must avoid commenting on the defendant's
failure to testify. In a recent case27 the prosecution misstated the law to
the jury by indicating that the burden shifted to the defendant to explain
his possession. Then, the prosecuting attorney continued, "I ask you today
if a reasonable explanation has been forthcoming?" The court held that
the misstatement coupled with the question amounted to a comment on
the defendant's failure to testify. The court was not required to consider
whether or not a correct reference to the law on unexplained possession
necessarily involves commcnt on the defendant's failure to testify, but the
judges seem to imply that the two arc not mutually exclusive.
DIRECTED VERDICT
Wiggins v. State28 is particularly important in that it resolves an
ambiguity that has been apparent on the face of the statute but had not
been considered by the courts. The defendant made a motion for a directed
24, 102 So,2d 47 (Fla. App. 1958).
25. 109 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1959).
26. 100 So.2d 662 (F13. App. 1958).
27. Ard v, State, 108 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1959).
28 101 So.2d 833 (Fla. App. 1958).
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verdict at the close of the state's evidence. Although the statute"sa provides
that the motion must be renewed at the close of all the evidence, it also
states that the motion is not waived by subsequent introduction of evidence
on behalf of the defendant. The court resolved the ambiguity in favor of
the defendant and allowed him to raise the issue of failure to grant a
directed verdict on appeal.
CHALLENGES
Two misdemeanor charges which involved the same set of circumstances
and witnesses were consolidated over the defendant's objection. He then
contended that he was entitled to double the number of peremptory chal-
lcnges. One case-' which contained dicta that seemed to substantiate the
defendant's position was distinguished on the basis that it was concerned
with two distinct homicides, one by a shot and the other by a beating. The
judges noted that the courts have discrctionary power over consolidation
and that the statutea" does not definite] declare that the number of chal-
lcnges varies depending on whether the cause involves single indictment or
information, or multiple charges which were properly consolidated. The court
held that in either event, the number of peremptory challenges given to the
defendant as a matter of right is the same, but that the court at its discretion
may allow additional peremptory challenges in a consolidated case as seems
just.3'
EVtIDENCF
1. Evidence concerning previous criminal activities and convictions.
In Williams v. State3 2 the court made an extensive historical analysis
of the general principle that although evidence of circumstances and
events concerning previous crimes is not admissible, evidence of a course
of conduct (which may involve a crime) is admissible to show plan, intent,
purpose or knowledge. It was concluded that such evidence is not admissible
for the sole purpose of reflecting upon the character of the defendant, but
is admissible if pertinent to issues in point. On this basis, the court decided
that in a rape charge, evidence of prior similar methods of operation was
admissible to show acts and circunistances in common. Evidence of prior
related acts was allowed in a "moonshine" charge,a:1 and in a case under the
Child Molester Act.' In a larceny case, :  evidence of indecent exposure
was unconnected and not admissible.
281. Fx.A. STAT. § 918.08 (1957).
29. See note 12 supra.
30. FLA. S'rAr. § 913.08 (1957).
31. See note 13 supra.
32. 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959).
33. Dixon v. State, 104 So.2d 122 (Fla. App. 1958)
34. Ross v. State, 112 So.2d 69 (Fla. App. 1953).
35. Conzalcz v. State, 97 So.2d 127 (Fla. App. 1957).
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Evidence of prior convictions is generally admissible for the purpose
of affecting the credibility of the defendant. A case of first impression'"
arose where the prior conviction was still on appeal. The court allowed the
evidence because the conviction at the trial level had overcome the
presumption of innocence and would stand until reversed. The court cited
cases decided in other jurisdictions as well as text material to support
its view.
8'
As a general rule, where the defendant has testified, he may be asked
on cross-examination if he has ever been convicted of a crime. If he has
been convicted once and denies it, the state may put the record of the
conviction into evidence. If the defendant admits the conviction the state
is prohibited from further questions in this area. The situation in Lockwood
v. State3 8 was complicated by the fact that the defendant had three prior
convictions. On cross-examination he was asked if he had ever been
convicted and he replied affirmatively. He was then questioned as to the
number of times. The objection to this question was overruled, and the
defendant admitted to one prcvious conviction. The state continued the
questioning and accused him of other convictions and introduced records
thereof. The defendant objected to the entire procedure. The court held
that the procedure was proper, and cited cases which "indicated" agreement.
II. Means and Types.
A. Wire tapping of party line.
In Griffith v. State,-" the defendant claimed evidence obtained by
wire tapping a party line was inadmissible. The court held that the effect
of the statute40 is limited to its provisions for a penalty and does not
invalidate evidence obtained by wire tapping. Since a person has a right
to use his party line, wire tapping, which merely made the process more
convenient, was not a violation of a constitutional right.
There was a short well-written dissenting opinion which stated that
one purpose of Section 22 of the Declaration of Rights, Florida Constitution,
is to protect the right of privacy. On a party line the user is warned of an
intrusion upon his privacy by the "click" of the receiver. The wire tapping
avoids the click and thus evidence so obtained constitutes an infringement.
B. Truth Serum.
A new question concerning truth serum was considered in a prosecution
for incest." The defendant objected to evidence comprising statements made
36. See note 35 supra.
37. 58 Am. JuR. \Vitnesses § 745 (1948).
38. 107 So.2d 770 (Fla. App. 1958).
39. 1l1 So.2d 282 (Fla. App. 1959).
40. FLA. STAT. § 822.10 (1957).
41. Knight v. State, 97 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1957).
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to a psychologist by the prosecutrix while she was under the influence
of truth serumn. The purpose of this evidence xwas to corroborate statements
she had made to officials. The court held that the evidence was not
admissible even for the purpose of corroboration because the serum does
not guarantee truth, but on the contrary may produce fantasies.
SEARCHI AND SEIZURE
The tendency in this area is to allow investigating officials considerable
freedom of action. A case of first impressiont12 in Florida increased the scope
of official action by admitting cvidceucc found in an automobile parked ill
the yard of the property designated in the search warrant.
The court seemed to employ quite a liberal policy (from the state's
point of view) in the determination of the justification for an arrest.
In one instance, 43 an officer suspected that the defendant was a bolita
operator and obtained a warrant for arrest for vagrancy. The defendant
was arrested and searched. The evidence so obtained %vas admissible on a
bolita charge because the arrest was not merely a ruse since the defendant
was also charged and convicted of vagrancy. In another case, 44 evidence
concerning possession of illegal distilling equipment was admitted where
obtained from the search of a car after an arrest for a defective tail light.
The courts also held that an officer may stop a person to inspect the
driver's license and during the process, if the officer sees evidence of a
crime, he may legally arrest. '-'
JTRORS
In a rape case46 a juror failed to disclose that his daughter had been
attacked in a similar fashion in the past. He also made a statement to the
effect that he would not reconmend mercy if the evidence supported a
conviction. The trial judge concluded that any prejudice the juror might have
had was not directed toward the defendant, and held that since the majority
recommended mercy the defendant was not adversely affected, and was not
entitled to a new trial. The court stated "... for it is abundantly clear
from his statcment that lie would not convict an innocent man .. " This
statement not only begs the question, but in the opinion of the writer,
many people who study behavior professionally would not be quite so
confident of this conclusion.
42, Alexander v. State. 108 So.2d 308 (Via. App. 1959).
43. Blake v. State, 112 So.2d 391 (Fla. App. 1959).
44. Self v. State, 98 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1957).
45. Cameron v. State, 112 So.2d 864 (Fla. App, 1959).




In one case4C 7 the State Attorney made the crass statement that
the jury should refuse to recommend mercy in order to protect the State
Attorney's family. The appellate court granted a new trial on the ground that
the defendant was entitled to a fair trial relative to questions of mercy as
well as to questions of guilt. In another instance 48 in which the jury did
not recommend mercy, the State Attorney argued that the state had no right
of appeal and that his staff considered that the death penalty was warranted.
The appellate court noted that the prosecution should not advise the jury
of a composite judgment of his staff based upon investigations made before
the trial. Since the criteria of guilt are specific, the two errors might not
require reversal if the evidence of guilt were great. On the other hand, since
the standard for the recommendation for mercy is relatively less specific,
the errors warranted a new trial. Two judges dissented.
READING PENALTY TO TIE JURY
In Younghans v. State,4" the statutory provision that the penalty must be
read to the jury 0 was again held to be discretionary rather than mandatory.
The rationale supporting this construction was set out in Simmons v. State,51
as follows. Vith the exception of capital cases where mercy may be
recommended, the jury has no concern with the penalty. The function
of the jury is to resolve questions of fact and then to apply the law
charged. Therefore, the only purpose of the charge is to inform the jury
of rules of law. Legislation which hampers judicial function may be
unconstitutional. If the word "must" in the statute is interpreted as an
unqualified mandate, it becomes an unreasonable infringement upon the
inherent power of the court to perform the judicial function because it
imposes the burden of performing an empty and meaningless act. When
a choice is possible, the statute should be construed so as to maintain
rather than destroy its constitutionality. Therefore, the provision is inter-
preted as being directory, not mandatory.
Since the penalty could be read to the jury in a few seconds, this hardly
seems to be a "burden" which would impair the function of the court to
such an extent as to involve a constitutional infringement. It has occurred
to the writer that perhaps the basic objection is not to the "burden" placed
upon the court, but to the concept that the jury should know the effects
of their decisions and accept responsibility for the results.
47. Singer v. State, 109 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1959).
48. Pait v. State, 112 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1959).
49. 97 So.2d 31 (Fla. App. 1957).
50. FL.. Srg. § 918.10(1) (1957): .The presiding judge shall charge the jury
only upon the law of the case at the conclusion of argument of counsel, and must
include in said charge the penalty fixed by law for the offense for which the accused
is then on trial."
51. 160 Fla, 626, 36 So.2d 207 (1948).
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INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION
Two cases turned on the point that if a particular word in the informa-
tion has a broader meaning than the correspotnding word in the criminal
statute, the information does not necessarily charge a crime, and is defective.
In a case 2 involving fish and game regulations the word "hunt" used in
the information was considered to be broader than the corresponding word
"take" in the statute. The court pointed out that the person might hunt
game for photographic purposes but not take any game in violation of the
statute. This point was affinned and used where in another information
the word "title" was considered to be broader than the statutory words
any ... evidence of debt, contract or property ,
MOTION TO QUASI
A problem of considerable importance arose in State v. Schroeder.4
The attorney for the defendant was questioned by the State Attorney and
the Grand Jury. The state subsequently indicted the defendant for murder.
The trial judge quashed the indictment because the communications the
defendant disclosed to her attorney were privileged and, in effect, the
defendant had been forced to be a witness against herself. The appellate
court reversed and said very explicitly: (1) The rule was affirmed that the
court does not inquire into the sufficicncy, legality or character of the cvi-
dence presented to the grand jury for the purpose of quashing an indictment;
(2) Section 932.29 of the Florida Statute does not apply because it does not
include murder; (3) The holding does not decide any issue concerning the
defendant's constitutional rights or the admissibility of evidence at the trial.
The dissent considered that the constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination was in issue and that the procedure constituted an infringe-
ment.
The effect of the decision was to prohibit a test of the constitutionality
of the procedure by the means of motion to quash. From an operational
point of view, if there is no pleading which would put the question in
issue, the procedure is not unconstitutional.
In another case of considerable practical importance, "', the defendant
on appeal claimed that the information did not state a crime. The state
argued that since the defendant did not move to quash, he had waived the
objection. The appellate court held that although many objections may be
waived in this manner, the rule does not apply here because the statute56
52. State v. Brown, 101 So.2d 599 (Fla. App. 1958).
53. Burton v. State, 107 So,2d 140 (Fla. App. 1958).
54. 112 So.ld 257 (Fla, 1959).
55. Fiske v. State, 106 So.2d 586 (Fla. App. 1958).
56. ViA. S-rA". § 920.05 (1957).
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which provides for a new trial if the substantive rights of the defendant
had been prejudiced specifically includes the situation where a crime is
not charged.
CONSPIRACY
In a very interesting opinion the appellate court reversed a conviction
of conspiracy to violate gambling laws.57 Conspiracy involves an agreement
and intent to commit the offense. Since the other member of the alleged
conspiracy was an officer acting according to a plan created by the govern-
ment, the court held that there was neither agreement nor intent within
the meaning of the statute. The court indicated that this view represents
the weight of authority and cited cases from other jurisdictions. No Florida
cases were cited and the writer found none. Three judges dissented without
opinion.
RAPE
The trial court quashed the information charging statutory rape because
the prosecutrix was unchaste due to prior intercourse between the parties
within the Statute of Limitations but in a different jurisdiction. On appeal,58
the state cited Hunter v. State 9 where the parties had had previous
intercourse within the Statute of Limitations and within the jurisdiction.
There, the court held that since the exact time of the intercourse is
immaterial, a prior act within the Statute of Limitations could form a basis
of conviction and thus should not be available as a defense. The appellate
court limited the Hunter case to its facts and held that prior out-of-state
acts could not be used as the basis for conviction in Florida and therefore
could be used to prove unchaste character. A dissenting judge argued that
the Hunter case stood for the broad proposition that the defendant should
not be allowed to assert lack of chastity as a defense where he was the
one responsible. In the writer's opinion, the intent, purpose and policy of the
statute are critical factors which deserve attention. It is unfortunate that the
court's opinion does not contain more discussion that would reflect consi-
deration of these matters.
LEGISLATION
The most significant statutory changes were an amendment to the
Child Molester Law60 and the enactment of the Criminal Sexual Psychopath
Law. "' This legislation represents major steps towards an attitude that has
been proposed by psychologists and psychiatrists for quite some time. The
57. King v. State, 104 So.2d 730 (Fla. 1957).
58. State v. Capps, 98 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1957).
59. 85 Fla. 91, 95 So. 115 (1923).
60. Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-1990.
61. Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-1989.
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emphasis is placed upon the person, not the crime. The persons are
considered individually, not as a class. Remedy is seen in terms of therapy
for the person rather than punishment, and in protection for society rather
than revenge.
TnE CILD MOLEs'rER LAW
The Child Molester Law now provides for a Florida Research and
Treatment Center to be supervised by a chief psychiatrist, a chief psycholo-
gist and a chief psychiatric social worker. The personnel at the center are
hired by a Board of Commissioners of State Institutions on recommendation
by the Citizens Therapy Advisory Board. This consists of the heads of the
departments of psychology and psychiatry at Florida State University, Uni-
versity of Florida and University of Miami. The function of the center is
not only to treat patients but to conduct research in the field. The Mental
Health Staff Board was created for the dual purpose of considering the
patients' degree of response to treatment with a view to discharge, and
studying ways to improve the effectiveness of the law. The amendment also
provides for treatment of prisoners not under the act and of individuals in
society who seek therapy. The amendment provides that the accused may
ask the court to subject the complaining witness to the same psychological
tests as lie himself undergoes, The option of the 25 year prison termn was
deleted.
ThE CRIMINAL SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH LAW
A Criminal Sexual Psychopath, as defined by the statute, is a person
who is not insane or feeble-minded but is suffering and has suffered for
at least four months from a mental disorder coupled with criminal
propensities to the commission of sexual offenses, and is dangerous to others.
The act may be applied to anyone charged with a non-capital crime or
convicted of a crime. The Circuit Court may conduct a hearing and
receive a report from a court appointed psychiatrist. If the person is
found to be a criminal sexual psychopath, lie is committed for treatment
in an appropriate institution. He must be examined at least once a year
and if subsequently it should be determined by a circuit court that he is
no longer a menace to society, he is either discharged, or (if criminal
proceedings against him still are pending) he may then be tried.
The act characterizes itself as civil, not criminal. The person must
answer questions by the psychiatrist or be subject to contempt proceedings.
Evidence of previous crimes involving sexual motivation is admissible. The
person is entitled to representation by counsel and the usual rights regarding




An excellent comment on this type of legislation86 indicates that there
are difficulties involved. From a practical point of view, such statutes
have had little application due to unsympathetic officials and lack of
facilities. Further, when the statute has been applied, the person involved
usually has not been the type who is a substantial menace to society.
From a legal point of view, such legislation has been attacked on consti-
tutional grounds.
62. KARPMAN, TlHE SEXUAL OFFENDER AND HIS OFFENSE:S 215 (19541.
